Risk-limiting audits bill

Summary#

Wisconsin SB 1177, titled “Performing risk-limiting audits and eliminating the process for removing excess ballots from the vote count,” failed and did not become law. It would have amended Wisconsin election statutes, added county-level audits, and replaced the current process for removing excess ballots; its stated goal was to check election results using statistical audits while preserving ballots that exceed the poll-list count.

  • County clerks would have had to audit selected statewide contests by manually checking random samples of paper ballots. A risk-limiting audit uses statistical methods to limit the chance of certifying an incorrect result.
  • The Wisconsin Elections Commission would have selected contests and audit samples, set standards, and investigated ballot-count discrepancies above 0.5% of ballots in an audit unit.
  • County boards of canvassers would have appointed audit teams with equal numbers affiliated with the two largest political parties; unaffiliated electors could also serve.
  • Instead of randomly removing excess ballots from the count, election inspectors and absentee ballot canvassers would have counted all ballots and documented the discrepancy.
  • If an audit led to a full manual count of ballots cast using an electronic voting system, the manual count would replace the system’s reported count for the official result. Existing voting-system performance audits would continue.

What it means for you#

  • Voters: The bill would not change how you vote or who is eligible to vote. It would change how certain election results are checked and how excess ballots are handled.
  • County and municipal election officials: County clerks would have had to complete audits before certifying results, with a special expedited-audit option in some presidential elections. Local canvassers would have had to count and document excess ballots rather than remove them.
  • The public: Counties would have had to give 48 hours’ notice of audits, provide public access, and publish audit records. The bill would also have required public contest selection and sample-drawing information.
  • Wisconsin Elections Commission: The commission would have had to develop audit procedures, data formats, and training materials, select contests and samples, and investigate sufficiently large discrepancies.
  • The bill would not have created a new independent agency or replaced the existing performance audit of voting systems.

Money#

No cost estimate is included in the supplied material. No publicly available information.

  • The bill would have required work by county clerks, canvassers, and the Elections Commission, but it gives no staffing numbers or cost amounts.
  • It calls for a state and local fiscal estimate, but that estimate was not supplied.

What is unclear#

  • The bill says audits begin with elections held after January 1, 2027, while its excess-ballot transition provisions refer to selected contests beginning January 1, 2026. How those dates would work together is unclear.
  • The bill’s definition excludes statewide contests decided by 0.25% or less from being “selected contests.” The supplied text does not explain how contest selection would work if the otherwise most-voted contest falls within that exclusion.
  • The commission would have to set procedures and minimum standards, but the bill does not itself state the risk limit or several operational details.
  • The bill requires county capability inventories and data exports, including cast vote records, but does not say what equipment or upgrades counties might need or what they would cost.
  • No details are supplied about how an investigation into a discrepancy above 0.5% would proceed or what findings or actions would be required.

Case for#

  • A manual check of randomly chosen paper ballots could provide a way to test whether electronic results are correct without manually counting every ballot in every election.
  • Keeping all excess ballots in the count, while recording the discrepancy, could avoid removing validly cast ballots simply because the ballot total exceeds the poll-list total.
  • Public sample selection, audit records, and chain-of-custody logs could make the checking process more open to public scrutiny.
  • The bill keeps the existing voting-system performance audit, so the new audits would add a separate check rather than replace that one.

Case against#

  • County clerks and election workers would face new audit, reporting, and documentation duties, but the bill gives no cost estimate or staffing plan.
  • Contest selection is limited, and the definition excludes contests with margins of 0.25% or less. It is unclear how the selection rules would apply to a very close contest.
  • The bill leaves important audit standards and procedures to the Elections Commission, so key details would be set later rather than in the law itself.
  • Counting excess ballots rather than removing them preserves them for the count, but it also leaves a discrepancy to resolve; the bill does not specify the outcome of an investigation or the remedy if the cause is not resolved.